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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background 
 
Peanuts are an important cash generating traditional crop in Oklahoma and grown 
primarily in the southwest and southeast portions of the State.  However, the more 
concentrated growing is found in Southwestern Oklahoma covering 66.50 percent of 
Oklahoma’s peanut producing area.  Peanuts rank 7th in value among Oklahoma 
agricultural commodities and Oklahoma ranks 6th among peanut producing states with 
4.63 percent of US peanut Production (Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics Service, 2003). 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of May 2002 (denoted as The 2002 
Farm Bill hereafter) brought about historic changes in the US approach to regulating 
peanut markets.  Before 2002, peanuts had been among a small group of US commodities 
regulated by marketing quotas.  This marketing quota regulation system was established 
during the great depression to support and stabilize growers’ incomes through supply 
limitation and price supports (Dohlman et al.).    
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Under the marketing quota system, supply controls assured peanut quota holders 
of receiving high support prices.  Those quota peanuts could be sold for the domestic 
food use market.  Peanuts produced beyond the quota limits could be sold at a lower price 
to the crush market or could be exported.  Non-quota peanuts were called “additionals”.    
Producers who were quota owners had the right to rent their quotas.  Under the 1996 
Farm Bill, these quota peanuts were priced up to $610 per ton.  Producers who did not 
have quota rights were assured only $132 per ton in 2001/2002 (1996 Farm Bill). 
The 2002 Farm Bill terminated this supply limiting marketing quota system for 
peanuts.  The new peanut policy implied that all peanut producers, whether quota holders 
or non-quota holders are eligible for the same kinds of government payments that are 
available for the mainstream commodity crops such as grains, cotton and oilseed crops.  
The 2002 Farm Bill includes three provisions for peanuts growers: direct fixed payments, 
counter cyclical payments and marketing assistance loans. 
 
Direct Fixed Payments and Counter Cyclical Payments 
Those farmers who have enrolled for peanut base acres are eligible for Fixed 
Direct Payments.  Direct Payments are derived by a formula from National payment 
rates, 85 percent of the farmer’s base acres and farmer’s payment yield.  For peanuts, 
Direct Payments are fixed at $36 per ton.  Farmers are eligible for Counter Cyclical 
Payments when the effective price falls below the target price.  The target price for 
peanuts is set at $495 per ton.  Unlike Direct Payments, Counter Cyclical Payments are 
variable. 
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Marketing Assistance Loans 
Peanut producers are eligible to receive marketing assistance loan benefits when 
the loan repayment rate that is established by United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) falls below the marketing loan rate, which is fixed at $355 per ton during the 
period of 2002-2007.  Producers can either repay the marketing loan at the lower of the 
loan repayment rate, repay the loan rate plus interest anytime prior to the date the loan 
matures (9 months from the date of the loan) or forfeit the peanuts used as collateral to 
the Federal Government at the loan maturity.  Alternatively, producers can forgo the loan 
and accept a loan deficiency payment if the marketing loan rate exceeds the repayment 
rate. 
 
Problem Statement 
 
 
US Peanut growers are a small but geographically concentrated group of farmers.    
Due to the crop’s soil and climatic requirements, peanuts are produced only in 9 states.    
These states fall in one of three regions: The Southeast (Georgia, Alabama, Florida and 
South Carolina), the Southwest (Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico) and Mid-Atlantic 
(Virginia and North Carolina). 
The passage of the 2002 Farm Bill eliminated the support price policy.    
Consequently, farmers are obligated to sell their peanuts at prices as low as half the 
support price prior to the 2002 Farm Bill.  Due to the fall in price, these peanut growing 
areas experienced large declines in the acreage in recent years.  According to the USDA, 
National Agricultural Statistical Service data base, after the establishment of the 2002 
Farm Bill, the US peanut planted acreage declined 12 percent from 2001 to 1.36 million 
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acres and was the smallest since 1982.  The decline in planted acres in the year 2003, 
compared with year 2001, was steep in Virginia (55 percent), Oklahoma (54 percent) and 
Texas (35 percent) (Fig.1) 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Figure 1: Percent Change in Peanut Planted Acres (2001 vs. 2003) 
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Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
 
Oklahoma peanut planted acres dramatically dropped in the 2003 planting season 
to the lowest level since 1928 (Fig 2).  The drop in planted acres caused reduced 
production and hence the value of production.  Oklahoma peanut production has already 
decreased to 98 million pounds in 2003 from 198 million pounds in 2001, more than a 50 
percent decrease in production.  Similarly, the value of production decreased to 18.7 
million dollars in 2003 from 54.2 million dollars in 2001, more than a 65 percent 
decrease (Fig 3).       
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It is obvious that in Oklahoma peanut production is not as profitable as it was 
prior to the 2002 Farm Bill.  The change forced many Oklahoma farmers to abandon 
peanut production and look for alternative crops.  Farmers have complained that the 
present market price for peanuts is not sufficient to cover the cost of production 
(Beerwinkle).     
 
Figure 2: Peanut Planted Acres in Oklahoma, 1925 - 2004 (in 1000 acres) 
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Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistical Service 
Many farmers have expressed an interest in switching to alternative enterprises.    
However, due to inadequate knowledge about the future consequences of the new 
alternatives, farmers are having difficulty in crop choice decisions.  At this time it is very 
important to carefully examine the profitability of peanuts relative to alternatives.  If 
peanuts are not profitable, farmers should be provided with information about the risks 
and rewards of feasible crop alternatives on the historical peanut growing lands.                                         
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Figure 3: Average Price of Peanuts Received by Oklahoma Farmers and the Value 
of Production (1990 - 2003) 
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Objectives 
 
General Objective 
The overall objective of this research endeavor is to increase the ability of 
Southwestern Oklahoma peanut producers to make more informed decisions related to 
changes in the farm operations.     
 
Specific Objectives 
1. Determine the profitability of producing peanuts in Southwestern Oklahoma, 
given the program changes in the 2002 Farm Bill. 
2. Determine the profitability of producing cotton, soybeans and watermelons on 
peanut acres in Southwestern Oklahoma. 
3. Determine risk efficient crop alternatives to peanuts in Southwestern Oklahoma
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
Historical Overview of U.S. Peanut Policy 
 
 
Most of the U.S. commodity programs originated with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 (Dohlman et al.).  The peanut program was in effect when 
peanuts were designated as a basic commodity in 1934.  Under this Act, peanut producers 
were mandated payments in return for taking land out of production.  In 1937, the 
Regional Grower’s Association was formed.  It purchased specified quantities of peanuts 
from registered participants at support prices set by the government.  However, this 
program was unsuccessful because it could not sustain high prices and non-participant 
growers expanded acreage planted to peanuts (Rucker and Thurman). 
Failure of this voluntary acreage reduction led to the establishment of a 
mandatory program in 1941.  Individual acreage allotments were set and penalties were 
applied to those who would produce on additional lands.  However, during World War II, 
these penalties were not applied.  As a result the U.S. peanut acreage increased to 3.4 
million acres during the 1943-48 period, up from 1.9 million acres in 1941 (Chvosta et 
al.). 
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After World War II, the Agricultural Act of 1949 established support prices for 
peanuts between 75 to 90 percent of the then current levels.  Payments of support prices 
were made only if acreage allotments and marketing quotas were approved by peanut 
growers.  Periodical approval of such allotments and quotas were made and this program 
was in effect until 1978.  During this period new peanut varieties were introduced and 
new production technologies were employed which led to the increase in per-acre yield.     
Rate of growth of production was higher than the rate of growth of consumption.  Thus, 
government purchases and the treasury costs of the peanut program increased 
substantially (Chvosta et al.).     
Due to the large program costs in the 1970s, the peanut program was amended by 
the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977.  According to this new program (1978-81), 
producers received the support prices only on quota peanuts and this time the quota was 
set annually in poundage terms to meet the market demand (Borges).  Growers who grew 
more than their poundage quota had two options for disposing of the additionals.  First, 
they could contract with handlers for sale in the export market or in the domestic crush 
market.  Second, the additionals were placed under loan with the area Grower’s 
Association.  Additionals placed under loan were guaranteed a minimum support price 
which was well below the quota support prices. 
The Grower’s Association incurred losses if it bought quota peanuts at the edible 
support price and resold them at lower prices for export or domestic crush.  However, if 
the Grower’s Association bought additionals at the additionals support price and sold 
them for edible support price through the buy-back provisions, it earned profits.  Such 
profits were distributed among growers in proportion to their additionals placed into the 
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association pools.  Under this program, losses and profits were treated separately for each 
pool (Rucker and Thurman). 
During the 1978-81 periods, farmers were required to own both the poundage 
quota as well as acreage allotment (Chvosta et al.; Rucker and Thurman).  However, in 
1982, the acreage allotment was abandoned.  Under this new program anyone could grow 
peanuts but only those growers who had poundage quotas were eligible to receive the 
edible support price directly.  Another potentially important change was the restriction 
under the legislation of quota owners’ rights to lease their quota.  Any quota owner could 
lease his or her quota without losing the quota but he or she was required to be involved 
in production of peanuts. 
During 1986-90 program periods, one of the most noticeable changes was in the 
distribution of profits from association pools.  Under the previous Act, the Growers’ 
Association pools were one of two types: ‘quota pools” and ‘additionals pool’.  The 1985 
Act eliminated separate pools for different types of peanuts within the area.  It also 
mandated that profits from the additionals pool be used to offset losses from the quota 
pools.  If any profits were remaining then they were distributed among growers who 
contributed to the profitable additionals pool (Rucker and Thurman). 
During this period, increases in quotas were distributed equally among all farms 
that had quotas in the previous year or had produced peanuts in at least two out of three 
previous years.  After 1991 increases in quotas were distributed proportionally among all 
quota holders in the state according to their total production rather than equally among all 
the farmers.  In any case if the farmers were not able to meet their quotas, they were 
allowed to carry the unproduced quantity, called carryovers, into the next growing 
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season.  However, the total national carryover could not exceed ten percent of the 
national quota.  This rule did not apply in the case of unfavorable weather and the 
occurrence of natural disasters.  In these cases, farmers did not need to produce their 
quota but only needed to show that they planted enough to meet the quota based on their 
historical yields.  If for some reason a growers’ quota was reduced then this quota was 
redistributed among all the producers in the state. 
The 1990 Farm Act legislated a minimum national poundage quota and support 
price escalator that raised the peanut loan rate based on estimated increases in production 
cost.  The loan rate for quota peanuts was set at $ 678 per ton and the national minimum 
quota was set at 1.35 million tons.  The peanut program came under substantial pressure 
after the approval of NAFTA and GATT.  The peanut program was blamed for creating 
barriers to trade and unfairly protecting peanut producers from international competition.    
This pressure led to the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
(Chvosta et al.). 
The 1996 FAIR Act had made some important adjustment in the previous Act.    
Before 1996, there was a price support system and a ban on imports.  A basic feature of 
the 1996 FAIR Act is planting flexibility.  At the same time support price was reduced by 
10 percent to $610 per ton from $ 678 per ton.  This was the first instance that the 
nominal price of peanuts was lowered in the history of the U.S. peanut program. 
Fixed payments known as Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments that 
were based on past production replaced earlier deficiency payments tied to continued 
production of specific crops.  The annual effective quota was reduced from 1.47 million 
tons for the 1995 crop year to 1.15 million tons for the 1996 crop year.  Leases and sales 
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of peanut quota across county lines were allowed but quotas still could not be transferred 
across states. 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm Bill) 
brought historic changes in the U.S. approach to regulating peanut markets.  The 2002 
Farm Bill terminated the existing supply limiting marketing quota system for peanuts.  
The new policy implies that all peanut producers, whether quota holders or non-quota 
holders are eligible for the same kind of government payments that are available for 
commodity crops such as grains, cotton and oil seed crops. 
The 2002 Farm Bill replaced the quota system with the marketing assistance loan 
program.  All farmers are eligible for the loan rate for the current production regardless of 
whether or not they qualify as historic peanut producers under previous programs.  The 
marketing assistance loan rate is set at $355 per ton throughout the effect of the policy 
(2002-2007).  In other words, the 2002 Farm Bill introduced a price floor in the form of a 
marketing assistance loan rate.  When the market prices are below the loan rate, the 
farmers are allowed to repay commodity loans at a loan repayment rate that is lower than 
the loan rate.  Marketing loan repayment rates are based on weekly national average 
prices for peanuts. 
Farmers can take the benefit of loan programs directly as loan deficiency 
payments (LDP).  Farmers have a choice to receive marketing loan benefits through 
direct loan deficiency payment when market prices are lower than commodity loan rates.    
The loan deficiency payment rate is the amount by which the loan rate exceeds the loan 
repayment rate and thus is equivalent to the marketing loan gain that could alternatively 
be obtained for crop under loan (Westcott, Young and Price).  When a loan deficiency 
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payment is paid on a portion of the crop, that portion cannot be used as collateral for 
another marketing loan (Westcott and Price). 
Direct payments under the 2002 Farm Bill are similar to production flexibility 
contract (PFC) payments of the 1996 Farm Bill.  The payment rate for direct payments is 
fixed and is not affected by current production levels or by current market prices.  Direct 
payments to farmers are based on historic acreage and historic yields.  The direct 
payment differs from PFC payments in that the 2002 farm bill sets a fixed payment rate 
on a per unit basis for the entire life of the Bill, whereas, the 1996 Farm Bill fixed total 
expenditure levels for each fiscal year (Westcott, Young and Price).  The direct payment 
rate for peanut is fixed at $36 per ton and is in effect through 2007. 
Counter Cyclical Payments are paid when the effective price for peanuts is less 
than the target price.  The effective price is equal to the sum of the higher of the national 
average market price during the marketing year for peanuts and the national average loan 
rate for peanut and the payment rate for fixed decoupled payment for peanuts (Chvosta et 
al.).  The legislation established a target price for peanut to be $495 per ton.  The 2002 
Farm Bill allows peanut quota owners to receive quota buyout payments regardless of 
whether they farmed or rented out the quota.  Quota owners can receive payments in five 
annual installments of $220 per ton during fiscal year 2002-06 or take the payment in a 
lump sum. 
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Policy Change and its Impact on Peanut Producers 
 
 
The U.S. peanut support program started with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933 (Rucker and Thurman, Chvosta et al.).  The program was introduced during the 
great depression of 1930s to support prices and stabilize producer incomes through 
supply limitations (Dohlman et al.).  Farm policy programs have changed substantially 
from their origins.  The basic direction of change has been a shift from annual acreage 
supply controls, combined with price supports above market clearing levels, to less 
supply intervention and more direct income support (Pease et al.) 
Head argued that the reform in the program may change the economic status of 
peanut producers because peanut production with a support price has been an economic 
backbone in many peanut producing areas for more than five decades.  Chvosta et al. in 
their study have shown that in the aggregate U.S. farmers would lose $ 712 per farm per 
year under the 2002 Farm Bill if they continue to grow peanuts.  More specifically they 
have estimated that quota holders will lose $ 332 million, however, the U.S. landowners 
would gain $246 million by selling additionals.  Chvosta further estimated that Oklahoma 
quota peanut producers would lose $ 4,759 per farm per year which is the highest among 
other peanut producing states. 
Pease et al. have reported that the 2002 Farm Bill has substantially decreased the 
annual net returns of the Virginia peanut producers.  Net returns over variable cost and 
variable cost plus fixed cost under the FAIR Act (1996-2001) was $87,405 and $ 39,177 
per farm respectively.  However, the peanut net returns over variable cost and variable 
cost plus fixed cost under the 2002 Farm Bill was estimated to be $3749 and $ -44,480 
per farm respectively.  This estimate shows that under the 2002 Farm Bill peanut 
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enterprise would barely cover its variable cost of production.  However, Pease et al. have 
further said that the Virginia producers can benefit if they take advantage of the planting 
flexibility provided by the 2002 Farm Bill and shift from peanut production business to 
the cotton production business.     
Smith and Bullen constructed a representative farm model for cotton and peanut 
production for South Central Georgia and Northeast Coastal North Carolina to determine 
the net farm income and the portion of the income contributed through government 
payment.  Profitability analysis using FINPACK, a farm financial budgeting and analysis 
software, showed that there is net increase in farm income under the 2002 Farm Bill 
compared with the FAIR Act of 1996.  The Increase in the net return is due to 
government payments.     
They found that for Georgia farms, government payments made up to 110.3 
percent of the net income and for North Carolina farm government payment made up 
114.6 percent of net farm income.  This indicates that both the farms are not profitable 
without the government payments.  Since this study assumes constant costs, price and 
yields, further study is suggested to incorporate price and yield risks which provide more 
reliable information about the producer gain. 
Unlike the FAIR Act of 1996, the FSRI Act of 2002 does not have any 
requirements to maintain production of any crops including crops for which the payments 
are based.  Direct payments and counter cyclical payments preserve farm acreage without 
artificially stimulating production in an attempt to increase revenue.  Fletcher et al. have 
used optimization models to determine the profitability of peanuts, cotton, corn and 
wheat in irrigated and non-irrigated scenarios incorporating the program payments.    
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Point estimates were calculated for both the 2002 and 2003 crop years.  Their study found 
that irrigated peanuts had the highest net returns in both years and non-irrigated cotton 
was least profitable.  However, it is noted that, peanut farms typically cover operating 
cost from market receipts. Fixed costs may be met with supplementation of government 
payments. 
Decrease in price and elimination of quantity control drives less efficient peanut 
producers out of the peanut business and benefits more efficient peanut producers 
(Dohlman et al.).  Lassiter evaluated the impact of the new bill compared with the 
previous farm bill (FAIR Act).  A whole farm budget was developed and analyzed using 
FINPACK.  The model farm was made up of 1000 acres of cotton, 300 acres of peanuts, 
150 acres of wheat and soybeans double cropped, and 50 acres of soybeans.  They found 
that the government payment was higher under the new farm bill and the peanut farms 
were still profitable.  However, each farm would lose $156.60 per acre if they continue to 
grow peanuts compared to the previous farm bill. 
Despite the risky nature of peanuts and other crop production business, none of 
the studies have done the risk analysis for peanut farms after the 2002 Farm Bill.  Risk 
analysis is equally as important as profitability analysis.  Moreover, farmers have the 
tendency to minimize risk rather than maximizing profits (Anderson and Dillon).  Davis  
et al. developed a stochastic simulation model to determine the optimal crop enterprise 
mix for both risk averse and risk neutral producers.  They found that peanuts are in the 
optimal crop enterprise mix regardless of price and yield expectations under the contract 
production.  However under the non-contract and pessimistic price scenario peanuts were 
not found efficient. 
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Risk in Agricultural Production 
 
 
Agricultural production is a risky business.  Farmers face uncertain yields 
(production risk) and prices (market risk).  Uncertainty of yield results from the 
unpredictable nature of the weather and performance of crops, whereas uncertainty of 
prices comes from the market conditions, input prices and so on.  Variability of yields 
and prices should be considered in making crop choice decisions (Anderson, Dillon and 
Hardaker).  Accounting for risk is important in crop production decisions where the 
accumulated effect of repeated choices may have significant impact on overall business 
performance (Hardaker). 
Decision makers are always confronted with the necessity of making choices 
among uncertain alternatives.  There is a considerable amount of literature that explains 
how the informed decision can be made.  One of the earliest and then very popular 
methods of ordering risky alternatives is Mean-Variance analysis, (E-V Method) 
(Markowitz).  Prospects with the same level of expected return but smaller variance are 
preferred by this method.     
Mean-variance analysis is appropriate when returns are normally distributed 
and/or the utility function is quadratic.  However, most of the outcome variables such as 
yield and prices do not conform to the condition of normality due to the limited data 
availability within the same technological and policy framework.  The utility function 
may also differ among decision makers.  In addition, only two moments of the probability 
distributions are considered in making decisions by E-V method, however, in reality the 
expected utility is a function of all the moments of probability distributions that enter into 
the decision making process (Hadar and Russell)  
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It is important to note that the level of risk associated with an outcome differs 
among decision makers (DM).  Different decision makers/farmers may have different 
attitudes towards risk.  Therefore, risk cannot be assessed without accounting for the risk 
attitude of the decision maker.  Choice of favorable and unfavorable outcomes can only 
be evaluated and compared knowing the decision maker’s relative preferences for such 
outcomes (Hardaker et al.). 
Risk averse is an attitude towards risk that will cause a decision maker to prefer 
an investment with a certain outcome to an investment with the same expected value but 
an uncertain outcome.  Alternatively, risk preferring is an attitude towards risk that 
causes a decision maker to prefer an investment with the same expected value but an 
uncertain outcome to an investment with a certain outcome.  The more risk averse a 
farmer, the more likely he or she is to make managerial decisions that emphasize the goal 
of reducing variation in income rather than the goal of maximizing income. 
According to the subjective expected utility (SEU) hypothesis, the decision 
maker’s utility function for outcomes is needed to assess risky alternatives (Anderson, 
Dillon and Hardakar).  The SEU of a risky prospect, calculated as the probability 
weighted average of the utilities of the possible payoffs, is equal to the utility of that 
prospect.  An important step in many applications of decision analysis under the expected 
utility hypothesis is the specification of a suitable utility function.     
Zuhair, Taylor and Kramer estimated three different utility functions using minor 
export crop data from Sri Lankan farmers to determine if the ranking of the prospects is 
independent of the functional form.  They found that the negative exponential utility 
functional form performed better than quadratic and cubic functional form.  They also 
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found that attitudes towards risk differ among functional forms.  A similar study by 
Binici et al. indicated that negative exponential functional forms best described the risk 
attitudes of the Lower Seyhan Plain Farmers in the Adana Province of Turkey. 
Mussar et al. have shown that the choice of functional form is critical because it 
can affect the classification of decision makers based on their risk attitudes.  Mussar et al.    
used three different functional forms; quadratic, semi-log and non linear to predict the 
risk aversion nature of twelve graduate students.  The semi-log functional form classified 
all subjects as risk averse.  The quadratic functional form classified three subjects as risk 
preferring and the rest as risk indifferent and the non-linear function classified all 
subjects as risk indifferent.     
There is a rich source of literature that shows negative exponential utility function 
and the power utility functional form best describes the farmers’ attitudes towards risk 
(Zuhair, Taylor and Kramer, Mussar et al., Yassour, Zilberman and Rausser, Binici et 
al.).  Some studies have just assumed negative exponential utility function and power 
utility function based on the previous studies. 
 
Stochastic Dominance Analysis 
 
 
Stochastic dominance criterion is a decision rule that provides a partial ordering 
of risky alternatives for decision makers whose preferences conform to specified 
conditions about their utility function (Kramer and Pope; McCarl 1988).  This method is 
considered superior to the E-V method because alternative risky prospects are compared 
in terms of the full distribution of outcomes not just in terms of moments of the 
probability distributions. 
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Hadar and Russell presented the concept of first degree stochastic dominance 
(FSD) and second degree stochastic dominance (SSD).  FSD is used to partition 
alternatives for decision makers who prefer more profit to less.  SSD requires an 
additional assumption that decision makers are not risk preferring, that means, the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient is between zero and positive infinity.     
Mayer came up with the stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) 
criterion, which is more powerful than FSD and SSD.  In this method the absolute risk 
aversion bounds are reduced to some specified level and the criteria are defined for all 
decision makers where absolute risk aversion coefficient lies anywhere between lower 
and upper bound. 
Hardaker and Lien introduced more straightforward and more discriminating 
SDRF, which they called stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF).  SERF 
partitions alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents (CEs).  The CE values show the 
amount of money that the decision maker would have to be paid to be indifferent between 
the particular scenario and a non risky investment (Richardson SIMETAR).  An 
advantage of using CE ranking strategy is that it is dynamic and updates itself each time 
the minimum and maximum risk aversion coefficient are changed (Hardakar and Lien). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Typical enterprise budgets for peanuts, cotton, soybeans and watermelons that are 
specific to Caddo County, Oklahoma are constructed in the Excel spreadsheet to generate 
net returns.  An enterprise budget is an organized listing of estimated gross income and 
costs used to determine the expected net returns for a particular enterprise.  Budgeting is 
a fundamental tool for financial planning and crop production decision analysis.     
Two budgets are prepared for peanuts, cotton and soybeans; one for dry land and 
one for irrigated conditions.  Two budgets are also prepared for watermelons; one for 
seedless watermelons and one for seeded watermelons.  Both seeded and seedless 
watermelons are grown under irrigated conditions.  This provides eight enterprise budgets 
as alternatives to determine the most profitable enterprise and to rank the associated risk 
of each alternative.  The purpose of preparing budgets in this study is to determine the 
profitability of existing peanut production practices in Caddo County to be compared to 
several other potential alternatives that may replace peanut production if peanuts are 
found to be less profitable.     
This study aims to identify not only the level of profit that each enterprise is 
capable of providing but also the variability of profit that is associated with each 
enterprise.  Several assumptions related to these budgets are described in detail in table 1.
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Each estimated budget is on a per acre basis.    Average farm acres in our model are fixed 
at 310 acres per farm because Caddo County has an average farm size of 310 acres 
according to the 2002 Census of Agriculture.  The budgets assume no economies of size.  
The subsection that follows discusses the components of enterprise budgets such as gross 
income, net revenue, variable cost, and fixed costs. 
 
Table 1: General Assumptions made while Preparing Enterprise Budget for 
Peanuts, Cotton, Soybeans and Watermelon produced in Caddo County 
 
1 Average Farmed acres for each crops 310 Acres 
2 Yield Coverage Level by Multi-Peril Crop Insurance 
(MPCI) 
65 % 
3 Type of Irrigation system Center Pivot Sprinkler 
4 Efficiency of Irrigation system 75 % 
5 Energy used for irrigation Natural Gas 
6 Machinery Custom Operated 
7 Typical wage rate paid for labor $ 7.75 
8 Annual Operating Capital Interest Rate 6.00 % 
9 Property Tax on Irrigation Structure 1.00 % 
10 Insurance Rate on Irrigation Structure 1.00 % 
11 Interest Rate on Irrigation Structure 5.50 % 
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Gross Income (GI) 
 
 
Gross Income (GI) is defined as the value of total output produced per acre.  GI is 
computed by multiplying average yields by average prices at the farm level for each crop.    
GI includes value of production and the payments received from the Government such as 
Direct Fixed payments (DP) and Counter Cyclical payments (CCP).  The method used to 
estimate DP and CCP are described in a separate subtitle. 
 
Price and Yield Data 
State level average annual producer price of cotton and soybeans for a period of 
10 years (1995-2004) were obtained from the National Agriculture Statistics Service of 
the United States Department of Agriculture (NASS/USDA).  However, the peanut price 
from 1995-2004 cannot be used because of the changes in the price support program 
mandated by the 2002 Farm Bill.  Therefore, weekly national market price for peanuts 
from 2002 (September) to 2004 (December) was obtained from the Farm Service Agency 
(FSA) of USDA.  These weekly prices were converted into average annual prices using 
simple averages.  FSA reports different prices for four different types of peanuts.    This 
study utilizes the price of the runners since more than 70 percent of the total peanuts 
produced in Caddo County are runners (Beerwinkle). 
Seedless and seeded watermelon prices were obtained from the Dallas Terminal 
Market reported by USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS/USDA).  These 
prices are wholesale prices.  Producer received prices are extrapolated from Dallas 
terminal wholesale price data assuming transportation and packaging cost margins of 30 
percent.  However, the actual margin will vary by an unknown amount depending upon 
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supply and demand situation in the Dallas terminal market (Wathen et al.).  Sources and 
summary statistics of the price data are shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Sources, Time Period and Summary Statistics of Producer received Prices 
for Peanuts, Cotton, Soybeans and Watermelons 
 
Commodity Source of 
Data 
Data 
Period 
Unit Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Peanuts1 FSA2 2002-04 $/LB 0.1807 0.0097 0.1700 0.1890 
Cotton NASS3 1995-04 $/LB 0.5049 0.1343 0.2950 0.7350 
Soybeans NASS 1995-04 $/BU 5.5500 1.1835 4.2500 7.4000 
Watermelon 
(Seeded) 
AMS4/Da-
llas 
Terminal 
Market 
1995-04 $/LB 0.1076 0.0262 0.0700 0.1470 
Watermelon 
(Seedless) 
AMS/Da-
llas 
Terminal 
Market 
1995-04 $/LB 0.1582 0.0743 0.0840 0.2800 
 
1 Prices for Peanuts before 2002 could not be used because of the change in the peanut 
policy.  2 Farm Service Agency, 3 National Agricultural Statistics Services, 4 Agricultural 
Marketing Services. 
 
Yield data were obtained from various sources.  Yield differs greatly between 
irrigated and non-irrigated conditions.  Irrigated and non-irrigated yield of peanuts and 
cotton for Caddo County were obtained from NASS/USDA.  Any missing value in the 
data set was filled by yield from neighboring Counties for that particular year.  There is 
no separate yield of soybeans for irrigated and non-irrigated condition reported for Caddo 
County or even the state of Oklahoma.  Therefore, the irrigated and non-irrigated yield of 
soybeans from Northern High Plain region of Texas is used assuming that this yield 
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closely resembles Southwestern Oklahoma yields.  The Northern High Plains region of 
Texas is geographically close to Southwestern Oklahoma. 
 
Table 3: Sources, Time Period and Summary Statistics of Yield for Peanuts, Cotton, 
Soybeans and Watermelons 
 
Commodity Source 
of Data 
Data 
Period 
Unit Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Peanuts 
Irrigated 
NASS 1995-04 LB 2906.50 270.894 2470 3185 
Peanuts Dry 
land 
NASS 1995-04 LB 1732.22 682.189 685 2535 
Cotton 
Irrigated 
NASS 1995-04 LB 641.60 231.622 232 1013 
Cotton  
Dry land 
NASS 1995-04 LB 270.15 95.839 137.5 498 
Soybeans1 
Irrigated 
NASS 1995-04 BU 37.83 4.095 32 44.2 
Soybeans1 
Dry land 
NASS 1995-04 BU 23.51 5.655 12.9 30 
Watermelon2 
(Seeded and 
Seedless) 
Lane 
Ag.    
Center 
- LB 15656.0 - 1210 40799 
1 Average annual soybeans yield (irrigated and dry land) is obtained from Northern high 
plains region of Texas which we assume to closely represent Southwestern Oklahoma 
yield.  2 there is no statistical difference between the seedless and seeded watermelons 
under irrigated condition. 
 
Watermelon yield for both seeded and seedless variety is obtained from Wes 
Watkins Agricultural Research and Extension Center, Lane.  The United States 
Department of Agriculture and Oklahoma State University jointly operate the Lane 
Agriculture Center.  This study uses historical yield for a period of 10 years from 1995 to 
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2004 for peanuts, cotton and soybeans under both irrigated and non-irrigated condition.  
However, according to the information provided by the Lane Agriculture Center 
scientists, yield for both the seedless and seeded watermelon can be assumed to be the 
same when irrigated.  But the producer received price for these two types of watermelons 
can be different. 
 
Government Payments for Program Crops 
Peanuts, cotton and soybeans are program crops and the farmers growing these 
crops will receive several payments from the government.  Payments are made based on 
the base acres established on the farm during the crop year 2002.  Base acres cannot 
exceed the farm’s cropland acreage. 
Once the farmers enroll in the payment program, they are eligible for the payment 
through the policy period (2002-2007) even though they did not grow that crop in a 
particular year.  Farmers can still receive payments although they choose to grow 
different crop in the peanut base.  However, the crop alternative should be a program 
crop or pasture. 
Watermelons are non program crops.  Any farmers who wish to grow 
watermelons in the peanut base without notification of cancellation of enrollment would 
not only lose peanut base but also lose the entire base he had on his farm.  However, 
farmers can choose not to enroll in the program any one year and again they can enroll in 
the very next year.  This flexibility enables farmers to grow watermelons in peanuts base 
without having to lose the payments for other base.  Farmers will however lose peanut 
base if they grow watermelons in peanut base. 
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There are three types of payments implemented by the 2002 Farm Bill: the Direct 
Fixed Payments (DP), Counter Cyclical Payments (CCP) and Loan Deficiency Payment 
(LDP).  There were no LDPs in 2003 and 2004 as the market price exceeded the loan 
rate.  Trend in the market price shows it is highly likely that there will be no LDPs in the 
coming years.  Therefore, we assume LDPs to be zero while preparing budgets.  DP for 
peanut base is calculated as 
(1) * * *0.85DP DPR PY BA=  
Where, DPR is the direct payment rate that is constant ($36/ton) and established by the 
2002 Farm Bill.  PY is payment yield and BA is base acres.  PY is determined by FSA.    
PY for Caddo County was set to be 3210 pounds per acre through the policy period 
(2002-2007).  Base acre may vary greatly among different farmers.  However, our budget 
model assumes it to be 310 acres.  CCP is calculated as 
(2) { max(Pr, )}* * *0.85CCP TP DPR MLR PY BA= − −  
Where, TP is the target price established by the 2002 Farm Bill ($495/ton), DPR is the 
direct payment rate as in equation (1).  Max (Pr, MLR) is either market prices (Pr) or the 
Marketing Assistance Loan Rate (MLR) whichever is higher.  MLR is set to be $355 per 
ton by the 2002 Farm Bill.  PY and BA are payment yield and base acres respectively as 
in equation (1).  The number 0.85 in equation (1) and (2) indicate that only 85 percent of 
the base acres are eligible for the government payments. 
 
 
 
 
 28
Estimating Costs of Production 
 
 
The estimated costs of peanuts, cotton and soybeans (irrigated and dry land 
condition), as well as watermelons (seeded and seedless variety) in this study are based 
on the data obtained from several sources.  They include different series of extension fact 
sheets from Oklahoma State University, information obtained from Oklahoma State 
University enterprise budgets software, Dr. Mike Kizer (Extension Irrigation Specialist, 
Oklahoma State University), Roger Sahs (OSU enterprise budget specialist) and the 
Cucurbit Manual published by Lane Agriculture Center.  These cost estimates are 
representative of average costs for farms in Caddo County.  Larger and smaller farms 
may have lower or higher costs per acre. 
 
Variable Costs 
Variable costs are independent of fixed costs and generally increase as level of 
management intensity is increased.  Items that are included under variable costs are seed 
cost, fertilizer cost, chemical cost, fuel cost, labor cost, repair cost, interest on operating 
capital, crop insurance, custom pre-harvest and harvest machinery.  Estimates of variable 
cost for each item that are included in the budget are presented in Appendix A.  
Machinery cost and Irrigation costs can differ greatly depending upon the type, size, 
expected life of equipment and the type of fuel used.     
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Machinery Costs 
Estimating machinery costs is a complicated and tedious job if done accurately.    
Machinery ownership might be profitable, yet it still may not be in the best interest of the 
business to purchase it.  Most machines last more than 10 years but financing their 
purchase through borrowing generally requires payback period of 3 to 5 years (James and 
Eberle).  If the loan payment period is shorter than the life of the machine it may cause 
cash flow problems and create financial stress.  Even if the machine is not dept financed, 
there is an opportunity cost of ownership that should be recognized when justifying a 
purchase.     
All of the machinery costs in the budgets prepared for this study are based on 
custom hired machines.  Custom hire is a common method for gaining short-term use of 
machinery services.  Custom machinery rates are assumed to be a reasonable 
approximation of the opportunity costs of ownership.  Justification for using custom 
farming/application services instead of owned machines are described as follows; 
1. Operator assumes the responsibility of operating the machine and its daily care. 
2. Farmers have no long term commitment in the machines 
3. Farmers know exactly what their costs will be for farm planning purposes. 
4. Farmers have no ownership responsibility, including purchase, finance and 
disposal when no longer needed. 
5. The hired machine will be nearly new and should perform efficiently with few 
breakdowns. 
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The Information regarding custom machinery rates is obtained from Okalahoma Farm 
and Ranch Custom Rates, 2003-2004, CR-205.  Summery statistics of these custom rates 
are listed in table 5 and 6. 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Pre-harvest Machinery Custom Rates used in the 
Budgets for Caddo County 
 
Custom Rates $/Acre Number Type of Operation 
Minimum Average Maximum 
1 Mold Board Plow 6.00 7.92 10 
2 Offset Disc 4 6.36 12 
3 Chisel Plow 4 6.31 9 
4 Spring tooth Harrow 2 5.1 8.6 
5 Field Cultivator 2.92 4.48 6 
6 Row Cultivator 5 7.86 12 
7 Stalk Shredder 5 6.5 8.5 
8 Bedding (Listing) 5 6.67 8 
9 Rotary Hoe 3 4.47 5 
10 Planter (Peanuts and Soybeans) 5 9 13 
11 Planter (Cotton) 3 6 10 
12 Sprayer (Insect and Disease) 2.5 3.32 5 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of Pre-harvest Machinery Custom Rates used in the 
Budgets for Caddo County (continued) 
 
Number Custom Rates $ per Acre 
 
Type of Operation 
Minimum Average Maximum 
13 Sprayer (Herbicide) 2 3.33 5 
14 Sprayer (Growth Regulator) 2.5 3.32 5 
15 Dry Fertilizer Spreader 2.5 3.04 4.5 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Harvest Machinery Custom Rates used in the 
Budgets for Caddo County 
 
Custom Rates  No. Type of Operation Units 
Minimum Average Maximum 
1 Combining Peanuts $/Acre 20 32.5 45 
2 Digging and Shaking Peanuts $/Acre 10 10 10 
3 Stripping Cotton $/Pound 0.05 0.08 0.1 
4 Hauling Cotton $/pound 0.03 0.03 0.03 
5 Combining Soybeans $/Acre 13 15 17 
6 Extra Combine Charge* $/Bushel 0.13 0.15 0.17 
7 Hauling Soybeans $/Bushel 0.1 0.13 0.15 
Source: Oklahoma Farm and Ranch Custom Rates, 2003-2004, CR-205. 
*Extra Combine charge for soybeans is applied if the yield exceeds 25 bushels/Acre. 
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Irrigation Costs 
Having accurate estimates of cost of irrigation is important when making 
irrigation decisions.  Cost of irrigation varies greatly depending upon the type of 
irrigation system used as well as the type of energy source used such as electricity, 
natural gas, diesel or propane.  The type of irrigation system used to prepare our budgets 
is Center Pivot sprinkler.  Energy cost is a major portion of the total cost of pumping 
irrigation water.  Our budgets are based on natural gas as an energy source.  Natural gas 
is considered a cheap source of energy compared to other types of energy (Beerwinkle, 
personal communication).  Irrigation cost applies to those crops which actually are 
irrigated.  Dry land crops do not have irrigation costs. 
Irrigation cost is estimated using the information provided by OSU Extension 
Irrigation specialist (Dr. Mike Kizer).  The cost information of the component of 
irrigation system such as cost of irrigation well, cost of pump, cost of center pivot, cost of 
column pipe and cost of motor is specific to Caddo County.  Details on these estimates 
are provided in the appendix C.  Irrigation labor, fuel, repair and maintenance are 
considered variable and can be different for different crops.  These costs depend on 
amount of water applied per acre, and the efficiency of the system. 
Fixed cost includes depreciation, property tax, insurance and annual interest cost.    
Depreciation is calculated as follows; 
 
Salvage value is assumed to be zero at the end of the useful life.  Purchase price is the 
actual dollar amount paid and may vary significantly from list price. 
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Annual fixed cost estimates for property taxes, insurance and interest are 
calculated by multiplying the appropriate percentage by the average value of the asset 
over its useful life, assuming zero salvage value. 
 
 
 
 
 
Net Returns 
 
 
Net returns are calculated for each crop alternatives as; 
(3)    NR i = (P i * Y i) - (VC i + FC i) + DP i +CCP i 
 
Where,  
NRi  is the net returns for ith alternative.    i is the number of alternatives. 
P i is the price of ith commodity 
Y i is the yield of ith commodity 
VC i is the variable cost of ith commodity 
FC i is the fixed cost of ith commodity 
 DP i is the direct fixed payment for ith commodity 
CCP i is the counter cyclical payment for ith commodity 
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Stochastic Simulation 
 
 
Stochastic simulation is defined as a tool for addressing “what if…” questions 
about a real economic system in a non-destructive manner (Richardson, 2005).  The 
purpose of simulation in agricultural production risk analysis is to estimate distributions 
of economic returns for alternative scenarios, so the decision maker can make better 
decisions.  Simulation can be done both deterministically and stochastically.    
Deterministic simulation does not address the risk around estimated variables.  Rather it 
uses a point estimate for each variable.  Crop production decisions have degree of risk 
associated with them such as weather and market condition.  Therefore, it is wise to 
consider a stochastically simulated model rather than to use a deterministic model while 
making crop production decision choices. 
It is very important to identify a Key Output Variable (KOV) before doing actual 
simulations.  In this study net return for each crop production alternative is considered as 
KOV.  To be able to simulate net returns one or more of the input variables of the model 
(exogenous variables) should be considered stochastic.  Our study considers average 
annual crop yield, price received by farmers and the custom machinery rates as 
stochastic.  The type of distribution that is actually used to simulate stochastic variables 
depends on the nature of the data and the number of observations.  Our data for yield, 
price and custom machinery rate does not conform to a normal distribution therefore, we 
used a GRKS distribution to simulate these variables. 
Gray, Richardson, Klose and Schumann developed the GRKS distribution to 
simulate subjective probability distributions based on minimal input data.  Parameters 
used for GRKS distributions are minimum, mean and maximum of the stochastic 
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variables.  GRKS distribution is a modified triangular distribution.  According to 
Richardson, 2005, the properties of GRKS distributions are as follows; 
1. 50 percent of the simulated observations are less than the midpoint. 
2. About 95 percent of the simulated observations are between the minimum 
and the maximum. 
3. 2.5 percent of the simulated observations are less than the minimum and 
2.5 percent are greater than the maximum. 
Enterprise budgets that include one or more stochastic variables are called 
stochastic budgets.  Net returns estimated from these budgets are simulated for 200 
iterations generating 200 possible net returns for each crop production alternative.     
Simulation was done using the SIMETAR© simulation package developed by 
Richardson, Schumann and Feldman in the Department of Agricultural Economics at 
Texas A&M University.  SIMETAR is an Add-in to Microsoft EXCEL© that is 
developed in Visual Basic for applications.  These iterated net returns are used in 
stochastic efficiency analysis to rank the preferred production alternatives.     
 
Risk Efficiency Analysis 
 
 
Risk efficient crop production alternatives were identified using Stochastic 
Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) criteria for a range of risk attitudes.    
SERF does not require a decision maker to know the actual risk aversion coefficient for 
an individual farmer.  Rather it uses a range of Risk Aversion Coefficients (RACs) within 
which all level of farmers are included.  SERF involves comparison of cumulative 
probability distributions of simulated net returns for each crop alternatives.     
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SERF analysis is performed using SIMETAR software.  SERF analysis is done 
assuming negative exponential utility function for which Absolute Risk Aversion 
Coefficient (ARAC) range is set to be -0.1 and +0.5.  SERF uses Certainty Equivalents 
(CE) to rank risky alternatives.  SIMETAR estimates CE as follows; 
(4)  CE = E – 0.5 Ra V 
Where,  
E is the expected net returns, Ra is the ARAC and V is the variance of net returns.     
 Instead of evaluating CE at the two extreme ARACs (as with Stochastic 
Dominance with Respect to a Function, SDRF), SERF evaluates CEs for ARACs 
between the Lower Risk Aversion Coefficient (LRAC) and the Upper Risk Aversion 
Coefficient (URAC).  An advantage of SERF over SDRF is that it can simultaneously 
compare several risky alternatives while SDRF is a pair wise comparison. 
Using the SERF option in SIMETAR, the Risk Premium (RP) for each alternative 
was also estimated.  Net returns for irrigated peanuts are considered as the base while 
calculating RP.    The formula used by SIMETAR to calculate RP is as follows; 
(5) RPj = CEalternative j – CEBase j for ARACj  
Positive RP for an alternative j indicates that it is preferred over the base j by the given 
amount in dollars, whereas negative RP indicate that the base j is preferred over the 
selected alternative. 
RAC where the preference changes is called Break Even Risk Aversion 
Coefficient (McCarl 1988).  This study does not involve elicitation of risk preferences 
from individual farmers.  Therefore, Break even risk aversion coefficient (BRAC) 
method is used to identify risk preference interval reflecting unique preference ranking.    
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BRAC for each pair of risky alternative is identified.  Richardson, Schumann and 
Feldmann (SIMETAR) suggest that BRACs are the same as the RACs where the CE line 
crosses in the SERF chart.  Using McCarls BRAC procedure we can calculate the actual 
range of RACs where one alternative is preferred and the range over which another 
alternative is preferred. 
Finally the probabilities for getting target level of net returns for each crop 
production alternative are estimated using Stoplight Analysis in SIMETAR.  Lower level 
target income and the upper level target income is set to $0.00 per acre and $200 per acre 
respectively.  Probabilities for less than the lower level of target income, in-between 
lower and upper level target income and more than the upper level target income is 
generated using SIMETAR and interpretation is done accordingly. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Profitability Analysis 
 
 
Our analysis starts with the interpretation of the average net returns generated 
from the deterministic enterprise budget model.  Average net returns, gross revenue, total 
cost of production and preference rankings based on average net returns for each 
alternative is shown in table 7.  The mean analysis indicates that growing seedless 
watermelon is the most profitable alternative with the net returns of $ 893.87 per acre 
followed by seeded watermelon ($ 674.39 per acre) and irrigated peanuts ($ 288.98 per 
acre) respectively.     
Growing dry land cotton is the least profitable option with average net returns of 
$99.52 per acre.  The second and the third least profitable alternatives include irrigated 
cotton and dry land peanuts with average net returns of $ 122.61 per acre and $ 148.51 
per acre respectively. 
Despite the change in the commodity program policy by the 2002 Farm Bill, 
irrigated peanuts are still more profitable compared to other program crops like cotton 
and soybeans.  Direct fixed payments and counter cyclical payments for peanut base was 
estimated to be $49.11 per acre and $133.24 per acre respectively.  Due to the planting 
flexibility provided by the 2002 Farm Bill, farmers growing any program crops on their 
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peanut base can claim these payments.  Therefore, not only peanuts but also cotton and 
soybeans average net returns is the sum of the actual income and the government 
payments for peanut base. 
 
Table 6: Ranking of Crop Production Choices based on Net Returns generated from 
the Enterprise Budgets using Baseline Mean Costs and Prices 
 
Crop Alternative Rankings Total Cost 
($/Acre) 
Gross Revenue 
($/Acre) 
 Returns 
($/Acre) 
Irrigated Peanuts 3 493.36 782.34 288.98 
Dry land Peanuts 6 421.87 570.376 148.51 
Irrigated Cotton 7 434.81 557.42 122.61 
Dry land Cotton 8 238.75 338.27 99.52 
Irrigated Soybeans 5 225.47 392.31 166.84 
Dry land Soybeans 4 107.03 312.834 205.80 
Seedless 
Watermelon 
1 1582.91 2476.78 893.87 
Seeded Watermelon 2 1010.20 1684.59 674.39 
Note: Both seedless and seeded watermelons are grown under irrigated conditions. 
 
Government payments have significant contribution to net farm income.  For 
farmers growing irrigated peanuts, the government payment constitutes 63 percent of the 
net return.  Highest percentage net return from government payment is for dry land 
cotton, 183 percent.  DCP payments, mean net returns and percent contribution of 
government payment to net return is shown in table 8.  Note that watermelons are not 
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included in the government program crops and farmers will gain no government 
payments for growing watermelons. 
 
Table 7: DCP Payments, Net Returns and Percent Contribution of Government 
Payment on Net Returns for Crop Alternatives in Caddo County using Baseline 
Costs and Prices 
 
Commodity DCP  
Payment1 
Mean Net Return 
($/Acre) 
Percent Net Return from 
Government Payment 
Irrigated Peanuts 182.35 288.98 63.10 
Dry land Peanuts 182.35 148.51 122.77 
Irrigated Cotton 182.35 122.61 148.72 
Dry land Cotton 182.35 99.52 183.23 
Irrigated Soybeans 182.35 166.84 109.29 
Dry land Soybeans 182.35 205.80 88.60 
Seedless 
Watermelon 
0.00 893.87 0.00 
Seeded Watermelon 0.00 674.39 0.00 
Note: watermelons are not program crops and are not eligible for government payment 
1DCP Payments ($/Acre) = Sum of Direct fixed payment and counter cyclical payments.
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Simulated Net Returns 
 
 
Deterministic analysis provides us only the point estimate of the net returns.  It 
does not take into account the variability of the net returns.  Therefore to get a better 
informed decision, stochastically simulated net returns are utilized in this study.    
Simulated net returns provide us the opportunity to conduct the stoplight analysis and the 
risk efficiency analysis.  The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
simulated net return distributions for the eight crop production choices are given in table 
9.  There is a considerable variation in the mean net returns among different crop 
alternatives. 
 
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Simulated Average Net Returns generated from 
Stochastic Budgets ($/Acre) 
 
Commodity Mean Std.    
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum Ratio of Std.    
Dev. to Mean 
Irrigated Peanuts 276.34 35.006 174.53 358.20 0.13 
Dry Land Peanuts 133.24 84.920 -107.75 325.92 0.64 
Irrigated Cotton 120.90 106.586 -130.77 404.47 0.88 
Dry land Cotton 105.45 53.346 2.08 291.69 0.51 
Irrigated Soybeans 168.99 37.319 85.83 279.10 0.22 
Dry land Soybeans 200.93 31.723 120.74 296.26 0.16 
Seedless 
Watermelon 
1353.66 1835.954 -2602.86 9117.04 1.36 
Seeded 
Watermelon 
853.47 899.96 -868.47 3678.78 1.05 
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Simulated average net returns are consistent with the deterministic net returns 
except for seeded watermelons.  Mean simulated net returns were found to be the highest 
for seedless watermelon ($ 1353.66 per acre) followed by seeded watermelons ($853.47 
per acre) and irrigated peanuts ($ 276.34 per acre) respectively.  However, the standard 
deviation for seedless watermelon was found to be the highest (1835.95) followed by 
seeded watermelon (899.96) and irrigated cotton (106.586). 
Higher standard deviation indicates that the alternative has more variability of 
returns.  However, the knowledge of standard deviation alone does not provide outright 
decision to adopt certain crop production alternatives.  It may be possible and most likely 
that higher average net return along with the higher standard deviation is preferred to the 
lower average net return along with lower standard deviation.  Question still remains, 
how much lower average net return and lower standard deviation is low enough not to be 
preferred.  Therefore it makes sense to associate the level of probability for the given 
level of target net return.     
As explained in the methodology section, lower level target income and upper 
level target income was set to $ 0.00 per acre and $ 200 per acre respectively.  Using 
stoplight analysis with the aid of SIMETAR software, probabilities for obtaining less 
than $ 0.00 per acre, in-between $ 25 and $200 per acre, and more than $200 per acre 
average net returns from different crop production alternative is estimated and shown in 
table 10.   
Results from the stoplight analysis indicate that there is 98 percent chance for 
irrigated peanuts to generate net income greater than $200 per acre and for the remaining 
2 percent of the times the net return is in-between $ 0 and $ 200.  There is no chance that 
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the farmers growing irrigated peanuts will get negative returns.  Similarly, for seeded 
watermelon, chance that the net returns are greater than $ 200 is 76 percent.  There is 9 
percent chance that net returns fall between $ 0 and $ 200 and 16 percent chance of 
getting negative returns.  For seedless watermelon, chance that the net returns are greater 
than $200 is 72 percent.  There is 8 percent chance that net return fall between $0 and 
$200 and 20 percent chance of getting negative returns.  This implies that growing 
irrigated peanuts will generate 100 percent positive net returns, growing seeded 
watermelons will generate 85 percent positive net returns and growing seedless 
watermelons will generate 80 percent positive net returns. 
 
Table 9: Probabilities Associated with Net Returns for Different Crop Alternatives 
in Caddo County 
 
Probabilities Associated with Net Returns  Crop Alternative 
Less than $0 Between $ 0 and $ 200 Greater than $ 200 
Irrigated Peanuts 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Dry land Peanuts 0.07 0.71 0.23 
Irrigated Cotton 0.13 0.64 0.23 
Dry land Cotton 0.00 0.95 0.05 
Irrigated Soybeans 0.00 0.79 0.21 
Dry land Soybeans 0.00 0.49 0.51 
Seedless 
Watermelon 
0.20 0.08 0.72 
Seeded Watermelon 0.16 0.09 0.76 
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To make the stoplight analysis visually more clear, the results are also shown in 
figure 4.  The red color in the chart represents the probability that net returns can fall 
below $ 0 per acre.  Yellow color represents the probability that net returns can fall 
between $ 0 and $ 200 per acre and green color represents the probability that the net 
returns is greater than $ 200 per acre. 
 
Figure 4: Stoplight Chart of Eight Crop Production Alternatives in Caddo County 
 
Probability of Net Returns being Less than $0.00/acre and Greater than $200/acre
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Where, PNI = Irrigated Peanuts, PND = Dry land Peanuts, CNI = Irrigated Cotton, CND= Dry land Cotton, 
SBI = Irrigated Soybeans, SBD = Dry Land Soybeans, WMS = Seedless Watermelon, WMD = Seeded 
Watermelon. 
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Stochastic Dominance Analysis 
 
 
Stochastic dominance analysis utilizes simulated net returns distribution to rank 
crop production alternatives in terms of Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient (ARAC).  
Preferences ranking of different crop alternatives under different ARAC are shown in 
table 11.  Each column in the table shows the range of upper and lower risk aversion 
coefficient within which the preference prevails.  Seedless watermelon production is 
ranked first in the risk aversion coefficient as high as 0.000613.  The ARAC can be 
interpreted as the percentage change in marginal utility per unit change in the net 
revenue.  ARAC of 0.000613 implies that, $100 per acre increase in the net returns will 
increase the marginal utility of the farmer by 0.0613 percent.  The change in the marginal 
utility can be positive, zero or negative based on the risk averse, risk neutral or risk 
preferring nature of the farmers respectively.  
The seedless watermelon production dropped rapidly in the rankings as the 
ARAC increased, suggesting that a rough knowledge of risk preferences may be of 
significant importance in identifying preferred production alternatives.  Seedless 
watermelon production can be worse case for the farmers having ARAC higher than 
0.002280.  Preference ranking based on generalized stochastic dominance indicate that 
irrigated peanuts can be stable alternative and is ranked high throughout the range of the 
ARAC. 
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Table 10: Preference Rankings of Crop Production Alternatives in terms of 
Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
 
 Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower -0.1000 -0.0704 -0.0428 -0.0320 
Upper -0.0705 -0.0429 -0.0320 -0.0154 
Ranking 
 
Irrigated Peanuts 4 4 3 3 
Dry land Peanuts 5 5 5 6 
Irrigated Cotton 3 3 4 4 
Dry land Cotton 7 8 8 8 
Irrigated Soybeans 8 7 7 7 
Dry land Soybeans 6 6 6 5 
Seedless Watermelon 1 1 1 1 
Seeded Watermelon 2 2 2 2 
 
 Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower -0.0154 -0.0152 -0.0094 -0.0051 
Upper -0.0153 -0.0094 -0.0052 0.000613 
Ranking 
Irrigated Peanuts 3 3 3 3 
Dry land Peanuts 6 7 7 6 
Irrigated Cotton 5 5 6 7 
Dry land Cotton 8 8 8 8 
Irrigated Soybeans 7 6 5 5 
Dry land Soybeans 4 4 4 4 
Seedless Watermelon 1 1 1 1 
Seeded Watermelon 2 2 2 2 
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Table 10: Preference Rankings of Crop Production Alternatives in terms of 
Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient (Continued) 
 
 Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower 0.000614 0.001105 0.001216 0.001265 
Upper 0.001104 0.001215 0.001264 0.001324 
Ranking 
Irrigated Peanuts 3 2 2 2 
Dry land Peanuts 6 6 6 6 
Irrigated Cotton 7 7 7 7 
Dry land Cotton 8 8 8 8 
Irrigated Soybeans 5 5 5 4 
Dry land Soybeans 4 4 3 3 
Seedless Watermelon 2 3 4 5 
Seeded Watermelon 1 1 1 1 
 
 Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower 0.001324 0.001347 0.001361 0.002281 
Upper 0.001346 0.001360 0.002280 0.002769 
Ranking 
Irrigated Peanuts 2 2 2 1 
Dry land Peanuts 5 5 5 5 
Irrigated Cotton 7 6 6 6 
Dry land Cotton 8 8 7 7 
Irrigated Soybeans 4 4 4 4 
Dry land Soybeans 3 3 3 3 
Seedless Watermelon 6 7 8 8 
Seeded Watermelon 1 1 1 2 
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Table 10: Preference Rankings of Crop Production Alternatives in terms of 
Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient (Continued) 
 
 Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower 0.002770 0.002998 0.003343 0.003494 
Upper 0.002997 0.003342 0.003493 0.003501 
Ranking 
Irrigated Peanuts 1 1 1 1 
Dry land Peanuts 5 5 4 4 
Irrigated Cotton 6 6 6 5 
Dry land Cotton 7 7 7 7 
Irrigated Soybeans 4 3 3 3 
Dry land Soybeans 2 2 2 2 
Seedless 
Watermelon 8 8 8 8 
Seeded Watermelon 3 4 5 6 
 
 Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower 0.003502 0.003734 0.01042 
Upper 0.003733 0.010410 0.50000 
Ranking 
Irrigated Peanuts 1 1 1 
Dry land Peanuts 4 4 5 
Irrigated Cotton 5 6 6 
Dry land Cotton 6 5 4 
Irrigated Soybeans 3 3 3 
Dry land Soybeans 2 2 2 
Seedless 
Watermelon 8 8 8 
Seeded Watermelon 7 7 7 
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Confidence Premium (CP) results are shown in table 12-14 assuming ARAC of 
-0.01 for risk preferring farmer (table 12), -0.0001 to 0.0001 for risk neutral farmer (table 
13) and 0.01 for risk averse farmer (table 14).  CP indicates the relative conviction that a 
farmer has to a particular alternative ranking.     
The result shows that the risk preferring farmer will have to be paid $ 5390.13 per 
acre to accept seeded watermelon production (second best) over seedless watermelon 
(best alternative).  Similarly, risk preferring farmer will have to be paid $8305.07 per acre 
to accept irrigated peanut production (third best) over seedless watermelon (best 
alternative).  Risk neutral farmer has to be paid $ 640.92 per acre to accept seeded 
watermelon production and he has to be paid $1259.27 per acre to accept irrigated 
peanuts production over seedless watermelon.     
However, irrigated peanuts production is the best alternative and seedless 
watermelon production is the worst for a risk averse farmer with ARAC of 0.01.  He has 
to be paid $ 73.99 per acre to accept dry land soybean production (second best) over 
irrigated peanuts.  However, the risk averse farmer has to be paid as high as $ 2349.27 
per acre to accept seedless watermelon (worse) over irrigated peanut production.  This 
result clearly shows the importance of risk aversion coefficient while making crop 
production choices. 
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Table 11: Confidence Premium ($/Acre) for Risk Preferring Farmer with -0.01 
ARAC 
 
 WMS WMD PNI SBD CNI SBI PND 
WMS -       
WMD 5390.13 -      
PNI 8305.07 2914.94 -     
SBD 8381.23 2991.10 76.16 -    
CNI 8407.94 3017.80 102.86 26.71 -   
SBI 8410.91 3020.78 105.84 29.68 2.97 -  
PND 8421.36 3031.23 116.29 40.13 13.43 10.45 - 
CND 8465.15 3075.02 160.08 83.92 57.21 54.24 43.79 
Note: Crops in the column are dominant over crops in the row. 
Table 12: Confidence Premium ($/Acre) for Risk Neutral Farmer with -0.0001 to 
0.0001 ARAC 
 
 WMS WMD PNI SBD SBI PND CNI 
WMS -       
WMD 640.92 -      
PNI 1259.27 618.35 -     
SBD 1334.69 693.77 75.42 -    
SBI 1336.61 725.69 107.34 31.92 -   
PND 1402.08 761.16 142.81 67.39 35.47 -  
CNI 1412.21 773.29 154.94 79.52 47.60 12.13 - 
CND 1430.09 789.17 170.82 95.39 63.47 28.01 15.87 
Note: Crops in the column are dominant over crops in the row. 
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Table 13: Confidence Premium ($/Acre) for Risk Averse Farmer with 0.01 ARAC 
 
 PNI SBD SBI PND CND CNI WMD 
PNI -       
SBD 73.99 -      
SBI 107.54 33.55 -     
PND 175.35 101.36 67.81 -    
CND 176.80 102.81 69.26 1.45 -   
CNI 200.35 126.36 92.81 25.00 23.55 -  
WMD 647.11 573.12 539.56 471.75 470.31 446.76 - 
WMS 2349.03 2275.04 2241.49 2173.68 2172.23 2148.68 1701.93 
Note: Crops in the column are dominant over crops in the row. 
 
Pair wise comparison of simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of 
eight crop production alternatives are also provided in table 15.  There are two possible 
outcomes: either one alternative dominates the other or dominance can not be 
determined.  If one crop alternative dominate the other through the entire range of given 
ARACs, then either alternative in the column dominates alternative in the row (CDR) or 
alternative in the row dominates alternative in the column (RDC).  However, if the CDFs 
have an intersection then either column dominates row (BRAC with asterisk) or the row 
dominates column (BRAC without asterisk) above that intersection.  BRAC is the ARAC 
at which risk preference changes between a pair of production choices.  In other word, 
each BRAC is a reference point that separates the farmers by their risk attitudes. 
 
 
 52
Table 14: Break Even Risk Aversion Coefficient from Pair-wise Comparison of Crop Production Choices 
 
 
PNI PND CNI CND SBI SBD WMS 
PNI        
PND CDR       
CNI -0.0428 -0.0051      
CND CDR 0.01042* 0.003734*     
SBI CDR -0.0152* -0.0094* -0.0704*    
SBD CDR -0.0320* -0.0154* RDC RDC   
WMS 0.001105 0.001324 0.001347 0.00136 0.00127 0.001216  
WMD 0.002281 0.003343 0.003494 0.00350 0.00299 0.002770 0.00061* 
Where, PNI = Irrigated Peanuts, PND = Dry land Peanuts, CNI =  Irrigated Cotton, CND= Dry land Cotton,  
SBI = Irrigated Soybeans, SBD = Dry Land Soybeans, WMS = Seedless Watermelon, WMD = Seeded Watermelon. 
CDR = alternative in the column dominates alternative in the row 
RDC = alternative in the row dominates alternative in the column 
* indicates that row alternative dominates column alternative above this BRAC 
BRAC without * indicate that column alternative dominate row alternative above this BRAC  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Peanuts are an important cash generating traditional crop in Oklahoma grown 
primarily in the Southwest and Southeast portions of the state.  The 2002 Farm Bill 
brought about historic changes in regulating U.S. peanut markets.  Changes in the U.S. 
peanut program, coupled with increased costs and complexities related to irrigation and 
production inputs, have resulted in drastically decreased planted acres and forced many 
peanut producers in Southwestern Oklahoma to consider alternative crops. 
This study attempted to examine the economic risks associated with producing 
peanuts and common alternatives for peanuts in Southwestern Oklahoma.  A total of 
eight different enterprises were generated for analysis.  Enterprise budgets were made 
stochastic to come up with more informed decision.  Analyses were performed under the 
deterministic as well as stochastic conditions.  Both deterministic and stochastic analysis 
revealed similar results for mean analysis. 
Results indicate that seedless watermelon production is a highly probable 
alternative to irrigated peanuts if producers are willing to accept the risk associated with 
the perishable nature of horticultural crops.  The seedless watermelon production dropped 
rapidly in the rankings as the ARAC increased, suggesting that the rough knowledge of 
the risk attitude has significant importance in identifying preference ranking.  Preference 
 
 54
rankings indicated that the irrigated peanut production is a highly viable choice for risk 
averse farmers. 
Government payments play a significant roll in the sustainability of the farms in 
Southwestern Okalahoma.  Only irrigated peanuts and dry land soybeans were found to 
be profitable without including government payments.  All other program crops 
generated negative returns excluding government payments. 
As this study only considers eight different alternatives, this is not all that can be 
grown in Southwestern Oklahoma.  Further research can utilize several other alternatives 
to determine the profitability and risk associated with them.  Another research focus 
could be to determine different management strategies such as use of different levels of 
inputs, time of planting, use of own machinery so that precise information can be 
generated and disseminated to the farmers.  The results from this research are general and 
apply to the overall farmers of Southwestern Oklahoma.  Specific farmers may have 
differing results depending upon their farming conditions and the size of the farms. 
Another potential research area could be to evaluate the profitability under 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) participation.  Under this program farmers could 
retire their land under peanuts to the CRP through the USDA Farm Service Agency.  
CRP is a voluntary program where eligible farmers can retire their land for 10 to 15 
years.  In return the FSA will provide an incentive that is comparable to or higher than 
the rental rates.  This is a risk free alternative.  However not all farmers are necessarily 
able to enroll to this program.  CRP farmers can however grow perennial crops where 
periodic harvesting, haying and grazing are possible. 
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APPENDIX –A: ENTERPRISE BUDGETS 
Table 15: Variable Cost, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Irrigated Peanuts 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
Peanuts Pound 0.18 2906.5 523.17
Direct Payment (DP) Acre 1 49.11
Counter Cyclical Payment 
(CCP) 
Acre 1 135.06
Hay Ton 100.00 0.75 75.00
Total Revenue Dollars  782.34
   
Operating Inputs   
Seeds (Tamrun 96) Pound 0.57 75 42.75
Fertilizer Acre 10.16 1 10.16
Custom harvest   
Digging and Shaking Acre 10.00 1 10.00
Combining Peanuts Acre 32.50 1 32.50
Agro-Chemicals   
Disease Control   
Foliar Pesticide Acre 100.08 1 100.08
Sclerotinia Blight Pesticide Acre 80.40 1 80.40
Insect Control   
Asana XL Acre 6.16 1 6.16
Weed Control (Herbicide) Acre 24.34 1 24.34
Crop Insurance Acre 11.12 1 11.12
Annual Operating Capital Dollars 0.06 104.05 6.243
Custom Hire Acre 93.08 1 93.08
Irrigation   
Fuel, Lube and Repair Acre 33.95 1 33.95
Irrigation Labor Hours 7.75 1.54 11.935
Total Operating Cost Dollars  462.72
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  18.89
Taxes Dollars 1%  2.33
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.70
Interest Dollars 5.50%  8.72
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  30.64
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  493.36
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  319.63
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  288.98
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Table 16: Variable Cost, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Dry land Peanuts 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total 
($/Acre) 
Peanuts Pound 0.18 1732.22 312.84
Direct Payment (DP) Acre 1 49.11
Counter Cyclical Payment 
(CCP) 
Acre 1 133.24
Hay Ton 100.00 0.75 75.00
Total Revenue Dollars  570.38
   
Operating Inputs   
Seeds (Tamrun 96) Pound 0.57 75 42.75
Fertilizer Acre 7.36 1 7.36
Custom harvest   
Digging and Shaking Acre 10.00 1 10.00
Combining Peanuts Acre 32.50 1 32.50
Agro-Chemicals   
Disease Control   
Foliar Pesticide Acre 100.08 1 100.08
Sclerotinia Blight Pesticide Acre 80.40 1 80.40
Insect Control   
Asana XL Acre 6.16 1 6.16
Weed Control (Herbicide) Acre 24.34 1 24.34
Crop Insurance Acre 19.34 1 19.34
Annual Operating Capital Dollars 0.06 97.67 5.86
Custom Hire Acre 93.08 1 93.08
Total Operating Cost Dollars  421.87
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  0.00
Taxes Dollars 1%  0.00
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.00
Interest Dollars 5.50%  0.00
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  0.00
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  421.87
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  148.51
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  148.51
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Table 17: Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Irrigated Cotton 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
    Cotton Pound 0.50 641.6 323.94
    Direct Payment (DP) Acre 1 49.11
    Counter Cyclical Payment (CCP) Acre 1 135.06
    Cotton Seed Cwt 4.76 10.74 51.12
Total Revenue Dollars  557.42
   
Operating Inputs   
Seed Pound 1.08 18.3 19.76
Fertilizer Acre 33.49 1 33.49
Custom harvest   
Stripping Cotton Pound 0.08 641.6 51.33
Hauling Cotton Pound 0.03 641.6 19.25
Agro-Chemicals (Pesticide) Acre 25.96 1 25.96
Growth Regulators Fl. Oz. 0.94 8 7.52
Crop Insurance Acre 9.91 1 9.91
Annual Operating Capital Acre 0.06 122.14 7.33
Custom Hire Acre 73.82 1 73.82
Ginning and Processing Acre 72.66 1 72.66
Irrigation   
Fuel, Lube and Repair Acre 48.55 1 48.55
Irrigation Labor Hours 7.75 2.68 20.77
Other Expenses Acre 13.82 1 13.82
Total Operating Cost Dollars  404.17
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  18.89
Taxes Dollars 1%  2.33
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.70
Interest Dollars 5.50%  8.72
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  30.64
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  434.81
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  153.25
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  122.61
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Table 18: Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Dry land Cotton 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
Cotton Pound 0.50 270.15 136.40
Direct Payment (DP) Acre 1 49.11
Counter Cyclical Payment 
(CCP) 
Acre 1 133.24
Cotton Seed Cwt 4.76 4.1 19.52
Total Revenue Dollars  338.27
   
Operating Inputs   
Seed Pound 1.00 11 11
Fertilizer Acre 11.77 1 11.77
Custom harvest   
Stripping Cotton Pound 0.08 270.15 21.61
Hauling Cotton Pound 0.03 270.15 8.10
Agro-Chemicals (Pesticide) Acre 25.96 1 25.96
Growth Regulators Fl.    Oz. 0.94 8 7.52
Crop Insurance Acre 9.91 1 9.91
Annual Operating Capital Acre 0.06 80.52 4.83
Custom Hire Acre 73.82 1 73.82
Ginning and Processing Acre 27.76 1 27.76
Other Expenses Acre 9.91 1 9.91
Total Operating Cost Dollars  238.75
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  0.00
Taxes Dollars 1%  0.00
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.00
Interest Dollars 5.50%  0.00
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  0.00
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  238.75
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  99.52
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  99.52
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Table 19: Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Irrigated Soybeans 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
Soybeans Bushel 5.5 37.83 209.96
Direct Payment (DP) Acre 1 49.11
Counter Cyclical Payment 
(CCP) 
Acre 1 133.24
Total Revenue Dollars  392.31
   
Operating Inputs   
Seeds  Pound 0.35 50 17.5
Fertilizer Acre  0.00
Custom harvest   
Combining Soybeans Acre 15 1 15
Extra Combine charge Bushel 0.15 12.83 1.92
Hauling soybeans Acre 0.13 37.83 4.92
Agro-Chemicals (Pesticide) Acre 19.7 1 19.7
Crop Insurance Acre 4.41 1 4.41
Annual Operating Capital Dollars 0.06 48.24 2.89
Custom Hire Acre 45.81 1 45.81
Irrigation   
Fuel, Lube and Repair Acre 58.22 1 58.22
Irrigation Labor Hours 7.75 0.23 1.78
Total Operating Cost Dollars  172.16
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  18.89
Taxes Dollars 1%  2.33
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.70
Interest Dollars 5.50%  8.72
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  30.64
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  202.80
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  220.15
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  189.51
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Table 20: Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Dry land Soybeans 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
Soybeans Bushel 5.5 23.51 130.48
Direct Payment (DP) Acre 1 49.11
Counter Cyclical Payment 
(CCP) 
Acre 1 133.24
Total Revenue Dollars  312.83
   
Operating Inputs   
Seeds  Pound 17.4 1 17.4
Fertilizer Acre  0.00
Custom harvest   
Combining Soybeans Acre 15 1 15
Extra Combine charge Bushel 0.15 0 0.00
Hauling soybeans Acre 0.13 23.51 3.06
Agro-Chemicals (Pesticide) Acre 19.7 1 19.7
Crop Insurance Acre 4.1 1 4.1
Annual Operating Capital Dollars 0.06 32.71 1.96
Custom Hire Acre 45.81 1 45.81
Total Operating Cost Dollars  107.03
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  0.00
Taxes Dollars 1%  0.00
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.00
Interest Dollars 5.50%  0.00
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  0.00
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  107.03
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  205.8
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  205.8
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Table 21: Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Seedless Watermelon 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
Watermelon Pound 0.16 15656 2476.78
   
Total Revenue Dollars  2476.78
   
Operating Inputs   
Watermelon Transplants Plants 0.28 1452 406.56
Transplant Labor Plants 0.08 1452 116.16
Fertilizer Acre 30.3 1 30.3
Agro-Chemicals   
Fungicide Acre 147.61 1 147.61
Insecticide Acre 44.44 1 44.44
Herbicide Acre 26.94 1 26.94
Hoeing Labor Hours 7.5 16 120
Pruning Labor Hours 7.5 4 30
Harvest Cost Pound 0.01 15656 156.56
Marketing Cost Pound 0.015 15656 234.84
Annual Operating Capital Dollars 0.06 234.5 14.07
Custom Hire Acre 171.59 1 171.59
Irrigation   
Fuel, Lube and Repair Acre 21.55 1 21.55
Irrigation Labor Hours 7.75 0.22 1.65
Windbreak Plantation Acre 20 1 20
Bee Hive Rent Hive 25 0.4 10
Total Operating Cost Dollars  1552.27
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  18.89
Taxes Dollars 1%  2.33
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.70
Interest Dollars 5.50%  8.72
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  30.64
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  1582.91
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  924.51
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  893.87
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Table 22: Variable Costs, Fixed Costs, Revenue and Net Returns for Custom 
Operated Seeded Watermelons 
 
Production Units Price Quantity Total ($/Acre) 
Watermelon Pound 0.11 15656 1684.59
   
Total Revenue Dollars  1684.59
   
Operating Inputs   
Watermelon Seed Pound 18 5 90
Fertilizer Acre 30.3 1 30.3
Agro-Chemicals   
Fungicide Acre 147.61 1 147.61
Insecticide Acre 44.44 1 44.44
Herbicide Acre 26.94 1 26.94
Hoeing Labor Hours 7.5 16 120
Pruning Labor Hours 7.5 4 30
Harvest Cost Pound 0.01 15656 156.56
Marketing Cost Pound 0.015 15656 234.84
Annual Operating Capital Dollars 0.06 123.47 7.41
Custom Hire Acre 68.26 1 68.26
Irrigation   
Fuel, Lube and Repair Acre 21.55 1 21.55
Irrigation Labor Hours 7.75 0.22 1.65
Total Operating Cost Dollars  979.56
Fixed Cost   
Irrigation   
Depreciation Dollars  18.89
Taxes Dollars 1%  2.33
Insurance Dollars 0.60%  0.70
Interest Dollars 5.50%  8.72
Total Fixed Cost Dollars  30.64
Total Cost (Operating and Fixed) Dollars  1010.20
Returns over Variable Cost Dollars  705.03
Returns over Total Cost Dollars  674.38
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APPENDIX – B:  FIELD OPERATION 
 
Table 23:  Specified Monthly Field Operations for Irrigated Peanuts 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
Offset Disc    1 1        
M.B.    Plow   1          
Spring tooth     1        
Planter     1        
Cultivator      1 1      
Sprayer (insect & 
disease) 
     3 2 3 1    
Sprayer (herbicide)     1 1       
Dry Fert.    Spreader     1     1   
 
 
Table 24: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Dry land Peanuts 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
Offset Disc    1 1        
M.B.    Plow   1          
Spring tooth     1        
Planter     1        
Cultivator      1 1      
Sprayer (insect & 
disease) 
     3 2 3 1    
Sprayer (herbicide)     1 1       
Dry Fert.    Spreader     1     1   
 
 
Table 25: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Irrigated Soybeans 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
Offset Disc    1         
Chisel   1          
Spring tooth      1       
Planter      1       
Cultivator      1 1      
Sprayer       1       
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Table 26: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Dry land Soybeans 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
Offset Disc    1         
Chisel   1          
Springtooth      1       
Planter      1       
Cultivator      1 1      
Sprayer       1       
 
 
Table 27: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Irrigated Cotton 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
Offset Disc 1            
Chisel  0.8           
M.B.    Plow  0.2           
Field Cultivator   1          
Springtooth    1         
Planter     1.2        
Cultivator      1 1      
Rotary Hoe     1        
Sprayer (pesticide)   1  1 1       
Sprayer (Growth 
regulator) 
       1     
S.    Shreader            1 
Dry Fert.    Spreader    1         
Note: Number of M.B. Plow and Chisel operation are in fraction because these operations 
are done once in several years. For example, M.B. Plow is used once in every 5 years, 
therefore only 0.2 times will be accounted for in an annual budget. 
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Table 28: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Dry land Cotton 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
Offset Disc 1            
Chisel  0.8           
M.B.    Plow  0.2           
Field Cultivator   1          
Springtooth    1         
Planter     1.2        
Cultivator      1 1      
Rotary Hoe     1        
Sprayer (pesticide)   1  1 1       
Sprayer (Growth 
regulator) 
       1     
S.    Shreader            1 
Dry Fert.    Spreader    1         
Note: Number of M.B. Plow and Chisel operation are in fraction because these operations 
are done once in several years. For example, M.B. Plow is used once in every 5 years, 
therefore only 0.2 times will be accounted for in an annual budget. 
 
 
Table 29: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Seedless Watermelons 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
M.B.    Plow    1         
Cultipacker     1        
Tandem Disc    1 1        
S.    Harrow     1        
Plastic mulch     1        
Planter     1        
Cultivator      1       
Sprayer (disease)      1 2 1     
Sprayer (Insect control)     1 1 1      
Sprayer (weed control)     1 1       
Bed Shaper     1        
Dry Fert.    Spreader    1         
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Table 30: Specified Monthly Field Operations for Seeded Watermelons 
 
Months Æ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Machinery             
M.B.    Plow    1         
Cultipacker     1        
Tandem Disc    1 1        
S.    Harrow     1        
Planter     1        
Cultivator      1       
Sprayer      2 3 1 1     
Dry Fert.    Spreader    2         
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APPENDIX – C: IRRIGATION ESTIMATES 
 
Table 31: Annual Fixed Cost Estimates for Center Pivot Sprinkler Irrigation System in Caddo County 
 
Items Purchase 
Price ($) 
Useful 
life 
Depreciation Property tax 
(1%) 
Insurance
(0.6%) 
Interest 
(5.5%) 
Total ($) Total per 
Acre ($) 
Sprinkler System 
(Center Pivot) 
50000.00 15 3333.33 500.00 150.00 1375.00 5358.33 17.28
Well 26100.00 25 1044.00  717.75 1761.75 5.68
Pump 3100.00 15 206.67 31.00 9.30 85.25 332.22 1.07
Column Pipe 12500.00 15 833.33 125.00 37.50 343.75 1339.58 4.32
Gear Head and Heat 
Exchanger 
3200.00 15 213.33 32.00 9.60 88.00 342.93 1.11
Natural Gas Motor 3400.00 15 226.67 34.00 10.20 93.50 364.37 1.18
Total Cost 98300.00  5857.33 722.00 216.60 2703.25 9499.18 30.64
 
 
Table 32: Annual Variable Cost Estimates for Center Pivot Sprinkler Irrigation System in Caddo County 
 
Crops Water 
requireme-
nt (inches) 
Water from 
Rainfall 
(inches) 
Water required 
from Irrigation 
(inches) 
Water required 
with efficiency 
(inches) 
Cost of 
Water 
(Acre-inch) 
Total 
Cost per 
Acre ($) 
Repair and 
Maintenance 
($/Acre) 
Total 
($/Acre) 
Peanuts 20 11 9 12 2.60 31.20 2.75 33.95
Cotton 28 13 15 20 2.29 45.80 2.75 48.55
Soybeans 31 15 16 21.33 2.60 55.47 2.75 58.22
Watermelon 15 5 10 13.33 1.41 18.80 2.75 21.55
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APPENDIX – D: Caddo County Peanut Information 
 
Acreage Information 
Year # of Farms Acres Planted Avg.    Per Farm 
2001 390 29,855 76.5 
2002 344 27,089 78.7 
2003 205 14,675 71.6 
2004 165 12,831 77.7 
 
 
Farms with Peanut Base Acres Established According to 2002 Farm Bill 
# of Farms Base Acres Avg.    Base Per Farm 
480 31,062 64.7 
 
Average DCP Payment Yield for Caddo County –  3210 lbs.    per acre 
       1.605 tons per acre 
 
 
Payment Data 
Target Price $495/ton 
Loan Rate $355/ton 
Direct Payment Rate $36/ton 
Maximum allowed Counter Cyclical Payment $104/ton [$495 – ($355+36)] 
2002 CC Payment Rate $95/ton 
2003 CC Payment Rate  73/ton 
2004 CC Payment Rate  59/ton (projected) 
2005 CC Payment Rate   Unknown 
 
 
Payment Calculation for the Average Caddo County Peanut Farm 
Factor 
Pay 
Yield 
Direct 
Rate Payment
CC 
Rate Payment Total 
Avg.    
Per 
Base 
Acre 
85% 1.605 $36 $3,178 $95 $8,386 $11,564 $179 
   $3,178 $73 $6,444 $  9,622 $149 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004    $3,178 $59 $5,208 $  8,386 $129 
 
 
Loan Deficiency and Marketing Loan Gains * 
Year LDP’s MLG’s Total 
2002 $493,391 $571,215 $1,064,606 
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* LDP’s and marketing loan gains are hard to allocate on an acreage basis.  They are  
based on actual production, a single producer can claim multiple LDP’s or MLG’s by 
submitting only part of their production for each request, and the rate changes on a 
daily basis as the market price goes up and down. 
 
There were no LDP’s or MLG’s in 2003 or 2004 as the market price exceeded the loan 
rate. 
 
All data is actual data from FSA files as submitted to Caddo County by producers. 
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